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EVIDENCE
I. CHARACTER EVIDENCE
In Johns v. United States,' the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
addressed whether a defendant places his character at issue when he
claims self-defense in a homicide case and introduces evidence of the vic-
tim's violent character. In a case of first impression, the court held that,
unless a defendant expressly puts his own character at issue, he is free to
introduce evidence of the victim's violent character to support a claim of
self-defense without putting his own character at issue.
In its decision, the court provided a lucid analysis of the evidentiary
problems that arise in such a situation. First, the court noted the funda-
mental rule of character evidence: "The prosecution may not present evi-
dence of the defendant's [bad] character, in order to show likelihood of
committing a crime, unless the defendant first places her own [good] char-
acter in issue."2 This rule is based upon fundamental fairness; to allow the
prosecution to introduce evidence of a defendant's bad character merely
because he testifies on his own behalf would "prejudge one with a bad
general record and deny him a fair opportunity to defend against a partic-
ular charge."3
Second, the court recognized the relevance of the victim's violent char-
acter to the defendant's claim of self-defense.4 Evidence of a victim's vio-
lent character "may be relevant to the two basic self-defense issues: (1) the
objective question [of] who was the aggressor, and (2) the subjective evalu-
ation of the defendant's state of mind: whether she was in reasonable fear
of imminent great bodily injury."' Finally, the court considered the rule of
evidential parity; if the defendant introduces evidence of the defendant's
1. 434 A.2d 463 (D.C. 1981).
2. Id. at 468 (citing Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475-79 (1948)); E.
CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 191, at 454 (2d ed. 1972 & Supp. 1978); 1 C. TORCIA,
WHARTON'S CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 229, at 489 (13th ed. 1972 & Supp. 1981).
3. Johns, 434 A.2d at 468 (quoting Michelson, 335 U.S. at 476); see E. CLEARY, supra
note 2, at 454; 1 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 57, at 456 (3d ed. 1940 & Supp. 1980).
4. Johns, 434 A.2d at 468 (citing United States v. Burks, 470 F.2d 432, 434 (D.C. Cir.
1972); Evans v. United States, 277 F.2d 354, 355 (D.C. Cir. 1960); United States v. Akers,
374 A.2d 874, 877 (D.C. 1977); Hurt v. United States, 337 A.2d 215, 217 (D.C. 1975) (per
curiam); King v. United States, 177 A.2d 912, 913 (D.C. 1962); C. TORCIA, supra note 2,
§ 236)).
5. Johns, 434 A.2d at 469.
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good character, the prosecution is entitled to rebut this evidence with evi-
dence of the defendant's bad character.
Noting that the issue was one of first impression, the court examined
approaches used by other jurisdictions. A few states follow the minority
"Missouri" rule, which states that when the defendant puts the victim's
character at issue to substantiate a self-defense claim, he opens inquiry
into his own character to the extent relevant to the issue of self-defense.6
However, the prevailing view holds that evidence of a defendant's charac-
ter can never be introduced unless the defendant expressly places his own
character at issue.7 The court of appeals agreed with the latter view, con-
cluding that it prevented the jury from improperly using evidence of the
defendant's violent character to offset his self-defense claim. Thus, it ruled
that evidence of the defendant's own bad character was inadmissible un-
less the defendant first placed his character at issue.a
The Johns rule follows the approach taken by the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence. Under Rule 404,' evidence of a person's character is not admissible
for the purpose of proving that he acted similarly in a particular situation.
However, the rule permits a defendant in a criminal case to introduce evi-
dence of a pertinent character trait of his own character,' or that of his
victim." Once the defendant offers evidence relating to the violent charac-
ter of the victim, the door to character evidence relating to the victim is
opened. The prosecution is then entitled to offer evidence of the victim's
peaceful character.' 2
6. Id at 469.
7. Roberson v. State, 91 Okla. Crim. 217, 218 P.2d 414 (Okla. Crim. App. 1950) (al-
lowing proof of accused's bad character in such cases unfairly prejudicial); Keith v. State,
612 P.2d 977 (Alaska 1980) (following FED. R. EVID. 404(a), proof of victim's and accused's
character are not interrelated); 22 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PRO-
CEDURE § 5237 (2d ed. 1981) (common law rule contrary to the Missouri rule).
8. Johns, 434 A.2d at 47 1.
9. FED. R. EVID. 404 provides in pertinent part:
(a) CHARACTER EVIDENCE GENERALLY. Evidence of a person's character or a
trait of his character is not admissible for the purpose of proving that he acted in
conformity therewith on a particular occasion, except:
(1) CHARACTER OF ACCUSED. Evidence of a pertinent trait of his character of-
fered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same;
(2) CHARACTER OF VICTIM. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the vic-
tim of the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or
evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the victim offered by the prosecu-
tion in a homicide case to rebut evidence that the victim was the first aggressor
10. FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(1).
11. FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(2).
12. See, e.g., United States v. Dennis, 625 F.2d 782 (8th Cir. 1980). In this extortion
case, the government was permitted to introduce evidence of defendant's prior acts to show
[Vol. 31:799
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The analytical symmetry of the Johns rule offers criminal defendants the
greatest protection possible by allowing them to present evidence of the
victim's character for self-defense purposes, without fear of being
prejudiced by having their own prior bad acts recited before the jury. If the
issue is whether the defendant had "reasonable fear" of the victim or
whether the victim was the aggressor in the incident, a defendant should
not be restrained from introducing relevant evidence for fear that he may
be opening the door to such evidence against himself.
II. WITNESS UNAVAILABILITY
Under the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution, a defend-
ant has the right to "be confronted with the witnesses against him." In
protection of this right, hearsay statements are usually inadmissible as they
deny the defendant an opportunity to confront and cross-examine the de-
clarant. In Ohio v. Roberts,'" however, the Supreme Court recently de-
clared that where the declarant is "unavailable," and where his statement
bears "adequate indicia of reliability," it may be admitted into evidence
without violating the sixth amendment. In 1981, the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals decided three opinions that addressed the admissiblity of
hearsay statements in situations where the declarant was allegedly
unavailable.
In Harrison v. United States,'4 the District of Columbia Court of Ap-
peals, sitting en banc, interpreted Roberts to allow the admission of certain
hearsay statements even where used to prove an essential element of the
government's case in chief. The court upheld defendant's robbery convic-
tion although the conviction was based on statements of the victim who
was not present at trial. Defendant was found guilty of robbing an eighty-
three year old man at a bus station as he disembarked from a bus. 5 A bus
company employee testified that he had observed the defendant's accom-
plice distract the victim while the defendant removed an envelope from the
victim's overcoat.' 6 Although security guards were summoned, defendant
quickly left the area.' 7 Approximately fifteen minutes later, the victim re-
ported to a police officer that he had "lost" an envelope containing $6,000;
the reasonableness of the victim's fears. The court held that prior acts may be relevant even
when they are not identical to those the victim fears, although similarity is an important
consideration in determining whether the evidence's probative value outweighs its prejudi-
cial effect.
13. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
14. 435 A.2d 734 (D.C. 1981) (en banc).
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he was at that time confused and disoriented and unaware that he had
been robbed."8 Although defendant was subsequently arrested, the envel-
ope was never recovered.
At defendant's trial, the government had to prove that the defendant
had taken something "of value" as an essential element of the crime. 9 The
only evidence to establish that the envelope had contained $6,000 was the
statement made by the victim to the police officer at the bus station. A
detective testified that he had spoken with the victim's daughter, who lived
with her father in Louisiana and was advised that the victim was undergo-
ing treatment for a nervous condition and could not attend the trial.20 The
trial court ruled the victim unavailable and, in lieu of his testimony, admit-
ted the police officer's report about the victim's statements at the bus termi-
nal.2 ' The court of appeals reversed, concluding that admission of the
officer's testimony deprived defendant of his right to confrontation because
the statement was used to prove an essential element of the government's
case." When Ohio v. Roberts was thereafter decided, however, the court of
appeals vacated its decision and agreed to reconsider the case. When it
reached the same result, it agreed to reconsider the case again en banc. 23
On rehearing en banc, the court24 affirmed defendant's conviction.
Judge Kern, writing for the plurality, set out the test enunciated by the
Supreme Court in Roberts for determining whether hearsay statements are
admissible:
[W]hen a hearsay declarant is not present for cross-examina-
tion at trial, the Confrontation Clause normally requires a show-
ing that he is unavailable. Even then, his statement is admissible
only if it bears adequate 'indicia of reliability.' Reliability can be
inferred in a case where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted
hearsay exception.
25
The Supreme Court, therefore, established a two-part test. Before hearsay
statements may be admitted in evidence and not run afoul of the sixth
18. Id
19. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-2901 (1981).
20. 435 A.2d at 735. Both the police officer and the prosecutor spoke with the victim's
daughter; neither spoke with anyone else.
21. Id
22. Harrison v. United States, 407 A.2d 683 (D.C. 1979) (vacated Jan. 21, 1981). "We
have grave difficulty, at least where the declarant is living, in permitting a hearsay statement
to be used to supply an essential element of the government's case." Id at 687.
23. Harrison, 435 A.2d at 734.
24. Four judges joined in a plurality opinion, two judges concurred only in the result,
and two judges dissented. Judge Gallagher did not take part in the proceedings.
25. Harrison, 435 A.2d at 736 (citing Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66).
[Vol. 31:799
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amendment the declarant must be unavailable to testify and his statement
must be reliable.
The plurality first examined the reliability of the victim's statements. It
found that his statement was a "spontaneous utterance" and thus admissi-
ble as an exception to the hearsay rule. Drawing on the Supreme Court's
teaching that reliability can be inferred where the evidence falls within a
firmly rooted hearsay exception, the court deemed the "spontaneous utter-
ance" exception to be firmly rooted and resting on such a solid foundation
as to permit an inference of reliability for confrontation purposes.26 It was
only at this point that the court questioned whether the government had
carried its burden of showing that the witness was unavailable. It noted the
sparseness of the government's evidence showing that it had tried to locate
and produce the witness. In light of the victim's advanced age, his uncer-
tain medical condition, and alleged inability to travel the great distance to
court, the court was finally persuaded, however, that the victim had been
properly ruled unavailable to testify.27
The plurality finally commented on the statement in Roberts that, under
some circumstances, "the utility of the trial confrontation [is] so remote
that it [does] not require the prosecution to produce a seemingly available
witness. '' 2' Although carefully pointing out that it was not fashioning a
rule that would relieve the government of showing witness unavailability
where the utility of trial confrontation was remote, the plurality did posit
that cross-examination in this case would have been of minimal value; the
defendant probably would not have refuted the victim's assertion that the
envelope had contained money.29
Concurring in the judgment only, Judge Ferren sharply criticized the
plurality's finding of unavailability.3 ° In his view, it was improper to rely
on the daughter's statement as to her father's inability to travel. The gov-
ernment should have interviewed the victim or his physician, rather than
rely on the opinion of a protective daughter whose desire to save her father
from stress might distort her judgment as to his actual ability to testify.3
Moreover, Judge Ferren took issue with the plurality's comment that
cross-examination would have been of little use. The court was in no posi-
tion to make such a speculative judgment.3 2 Nonetheless, because the de-
26. Id. at 736.
27. Id
28. Id at 736-37.
29. Id at 737.
30. Id at 737-38 (Ferren, J. concurring).
31. Id at 738.
32. Id
1982]
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fendant had not challenged the alleged unavailability of the victim, and
because Judge Ferren agreed that the statements fell within the spontane-
ous utterance exception to the hearsay rule, he concurred in the result.33
In a vigorous dissent, Judge Mack, joined by Judge Kelly, argued that
although the confrontation clause and rules governing hearsay statements
were built on the same premises, the two had never been equated.34 Thus,
a statement admissible as a hearsay exception might nevertheless violate
the sixth amendment confrontation clause. The preference for face-to-face
confrontation implicit in the sixth amendment restricts the range of admis-
sible hearsay statements by requiring the prosecutor to produce the witness
or show him to be unavailable. 35 And, once the witness is unavailable, his
statements will only be admitted if shown to be reliable. That the state-
ments qualify under an exception to the hearsay rule is not, in Judge
Mack's opinion, necessarily indicative of reliability. Since the Supreme
Court has not determined that the spontaneous utterance exception is
"firmly rooted," the reliability of such statements should be tested under
the four-part analysis set forth by the Supreme Court in Dalton v. Evans.
Courts should determine whether:
(1) the statement contained no express assertion about past fact
and so carried on its face a warning to the jury against giving it
undue weight; (2) declarant's knowledge for making the out-of-
court statement [was] well established; (3) declarant's recollection
of the crime [was] good; and (4) declarant [had] any motive to
misrepresent himself.36
Measured against these factors, Judge Mack would have ruled the victim's
on-the-scene statements unreliable.37 The declarant was in a position to
know the contents of the envelope, he had no motive to lie, and his state-
ment arguably contained no express assertion of past fact. However, the
victim's memory could have been faulty. In view of his advanced age and
disoriented, nervous condition, sufficient doubt was cast on the accuracy of
his statements to require the opportunity to confront and cross-examine at
trial.38
The Harrison decision is troublesome because it allows a prosecutor to
33. Id at 738-39.
34. Id at 739 (Mack, J. dissenting).
35. Id at 740.
36. 400 U.S. 74, 88-89 (1970).
37. Harrison, 435 A.2d at 740.
38. Id Historically, exceptions to the confrontation guarantee emerged only where the
declarant had died. Thus, the dissenting judges in Harrison found insufficient trustworthi-




make only a minimal showing of unavailability where the declarant's
statements meet evidentiary standards of reliability. Under the court's
analysis, sixth amendment protections will be satisfied whenever the prose-
cutor determines that the declarant is unavailable and the out-of-court
statement may be classified as an exception to the hearsay rule. This analy-
sis, however, ignores the Supreme Court's emphasis in Roberts, that relia-
bility may be inferred only where the hearsay exception is "firmly rooted";
in all other circumstances, additional indications of reliability must be
shown. The Harrison court failed to develop criteria for determining
whether a hearsay exception is "firmly rooted." As a result, it applied the
same standard of reliability to satisfy both evidentiary and confrontation
requirements. Consequently, the court of appeals altered the traditional
focus in confrontation cases from whether the statement is sufficiently reli-
able to justify depriving defendant of his ability to confront and cross-
examine to the more simple question of whether the statement is reliable
enough to meet evidentiary standards. At the very least, this evidentiary
approach to confrontation problems signals a potential retreat from the
close case-by-case scrutiny given to cases in which the defendant's right to
confront is threatened.
In United States v. Hsu," however, the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals seemed to impose a more rigorous duty on the trial judge. In his
first trial, defendant Hsu had acted as his own counsel and had cross-ex-
amined a government witness, Johnson. When Hsu was subsequently con-
victed of perjury, ° he appealed. His conviction was reversed on the
ground that the record below failed to show a voluntary and intelligent
waiver of counsel.4" During Hsu's second trial, Johnson claimed to have
no memory of the events to which he had formerly testified. The govern-
ment, therefore, attempted to introduce transcripts of his former testimony
under either of two hearsay exceptions-"past recollection recorded," or
"prior cross-examined testimony."42 The trial judge refused to allow the
transcripts to be introduced, ruling that Johnson was not "unavailable,"
39. United States v. Hsu, 439 A.2d 469 (D.C. 1981).
40. Hsu was convicted under D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-2501 (1981).
41. Hsu v. United States, 392 A.2d 972, 981-87 (D.C. 1978). In a long line of Supreme
Court and federal circuit court cases, defendant's representation pro se at trial must be ac-
companied by either a recorded "knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel, or by a record
showing defendant was offered counsel but intelligently and understandingly rejected the
offer." Carnley v. Coshian, 369 U.S. 506, 516 (1962). See also Faretta v. California, 422 U.S.
806, 835 (1975); Von Moltka v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 727 (1948); Adams v. United States ex
rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279 (1942); Johnson v. Dabst, 304 U.S. 450, 464 (1930). The
burden of proving waiver is on the government. In Hsu v. United States, 392 A.2d 972 (D.C.
1978), the government failed to prove that Hsu's waiver had been knowing and intelligent.
Id at 984-85.
42. The District of Columbia has not adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence, relying
1982]
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and that admission of transcripts in lieu of an available witness violated
defendant's right of confrontation. The government appealed.
The court of appeals, relying on Ohio v. Roberts,4 3 reversed. The court
began its analysis by referring to the two-prong analysis set out in Roberts.
First, before hearsay evidence can be admitted, the need for the evidence
must be established-the witness must be found "unavailable" to testify at
the present trial." Once the unavailability threshold is crossed, the second
prong of the analysis addresses the trustworthiness of the former testi-
mony. This prong is critical since it satisfies the requirements of the sixth
amendment confrontation clause.45 In Roberts, the Supreme Court had in-
dicated that statements that may be characterized within a firmly rooted
exception to the hearsay rule are usually sufficiently trustworthy to be ad-
missible. 6 The Court had recognized, however, that under special circum-
stances, even a firmly rooted exception would not in itself verify
trustworthiness and further scrutiny would be required to establish added
indicia of reliability.
47
Applying Roberts, the Hsu court first addressed the "unavailability" re-
quirement. It relied on cases from other federal circuits, 4 8 rule 804(a) of
the Federal Rules of Evidence, 49 and commentators5" to find that the wit-
instead on common law development of the law of evidence. See Jackson v. United States,
424 A.2d 40, 42 (D.C. 1980).
43. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
44. Hsu, 439 A.2d at 471-72.
45. Id
46. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.
47. Id at 73 & n.12 (citing Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204 (1972)). In Mancusi, the
defendant was initially represented by counsel that had been appointed only four days prior
to trial. Upon appeal, counsel was ruled to have been ineffective and the defendant was
granted a new trial. When a witness who had testified at the first trial was ruled unavailable
at the second, the prosecution sought to introduce cross-examination from the first trial. The
Supreme Court was asked to decide Whether there were sufficient indicia of reliability asso-
ciated with the cross-examination by the ineffective counsel to allow admission at the second
trial. Exploring the "character of the actual cross-examination to ensure that an adequate
opportunity for full cross-examination had been afforded the defendant," the Court found
the earlier cross-examination satisfactory, and the transcript therefore admissible.
48. United States v. Collins, 478 F.2d 837, 839 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Insana,
423 F.2d 1165, 1170 (2d Cir. 1970).
49. FED. R. EvID. 804(a), provides in pertinent part:
'Unavailability as a witness' includes situations in which the declarant-
(3) testifies to a lack of memory of the subject matter of his statement;
A declarant is not unavailable as a witness if his exemption, refusal, claim oflack of
memory, inability, or absence is due to the procurement or wrongdoing of the pro-
ponent of his statement for the purpose of preventing the witness from attending or
testifying.
50. J. WEINSTEIN & M. BEROER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, § 801(d)(l)(A), at 801-99
[Vol. 31:799
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ness was properly "unavailable" for testimony at the second trial when he
simply claimed loss of memory. It was immaterial for purposes of unavail-
ability whether his loss of memory was genuine or feigned.51
Addressing the second prong of the Roberts test, the Hsu court found
that the former sworn testimony exception to the hearsay rule was a firmly
rooted one and, therefore, Johnson's former testimony would normally be
readily admissible. However, because of the special circumstances of the
defendant's pro se representation, the court determined a need for addi-
tional indications of reliability.52
Examining the record of the original trial, the Hsu court was impressed
by the defendant's cross-examination of Johnson. Hsu had highlighted in-
congruities, pointed out inaccuracies, used leading questions, and, in gen-
eral, "exhibited considerable skill in his . . . cross-examination of
witnesses."53 The court concluded that the cross-examination was "effec-
tive enough to assure that full opportunity for cross-examination was af-
forded appellee, as required by Ohio v. Roberts, and thus the
trustworthiness of the prior cross-examined testimony is also assured."54
The Hsu decision, in refusing to declare a hearsay statement reliable
whenever it fits into an exception to the hearsay rule, is more in harmony
with Roberts. In requiring particularized indicia of reliability, the court
requires close scrutiny of the statement beyond its technical classification.
And, in so examining the statement in the context of defendant's needs,
rather than, as in Harrison, in a vacuum, the court's analysis seems to ad-
dress more clearly the sixth amendment concerns.
In Warren v. United States,55 the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit addressed several evidentiary issues, again,
chief among them, the issue of witness unavailability.56 Here, defendant
n,13 (1980); S. SALTSBURG & K. REDDEN, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 600, 613
(2d ed. 1977).
51. Hs'u, 439 A.2d at 471.
52. Id at 472.
53. Id at 473, quoting from Hsu v. United States, 392 A.2d at 989.
54. Hsu, 439 A.2d at 473.
55. 436 A.2d 821 (D.C. 1981).
56. Under District of Columbia common law, prior recorded testimony is admitted into
evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule when:
(1) the direct testimony of the declarant is unavailable, (2) the former testimony
was given under oath or affirmation in a legal proceeding, (3) the issues in the two
proceedings were substantially the same, and (4) the party against whom the testi-
mony now is offered had the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant at the
former proceedings.
1982]
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was retried after his previous conviction had been reversed and was recon-
victed of kidnapping, armed robbery, and rape. He appealed, alleging that
several errors had been committed at his second trial.
Defendant first alleged that the testimony of two complainants given at
his first trial should not have been introduced into evidence at his second
trial because the complainants were available to testify personally.57 The
trial court had found the two complainants unavailable (and consequently
allowed the introduction of transcripts in lieu of their testimony) because
one could not be found and one was "psychologically unavailable."5" Al-
though the court of appeals reversed on other grounds, it sustained both of
these trial rulings.59
Turning to the psychological unavailability of one of the complainants,
the court noted that "unavailability" for psychological reasons had been
expressly sanctioned in only two cases, one in California and one in New
York.6° In reaching their decisions, moreover, both courts had been inter-
preting state codes that included psychological factors as grounds for un-
availability.6' The District of Columbia has no such statute.
62
Nevertheless, the court of appeals determined that psychological infirmity
was a reasonable construction of the witness unavailability rule. Where
experts had opined that submitting the complainant to the ordeal of testi-
436 A.2d at 825 (footnotes omitted). Defendant challenged only the trial court's ruling with
regard to the unavailability of the complainants; he agreed that the testimony was itself
reliable.
57. The trial court had actually approved the introduction into evidence of transcripts
from three complainants. However, because the third complainant had died since the first
trial, defendant conceded her unavailability and took issue only with the unavailability of
the other two.
58. Warren, 436 A.2d at 824.
59. Id at 836-43. The court of appeals reversed the lower court because it had improp-
erly allowed (1) the introduction of the complainants' pretrial suppression hearing testimony
along with statements made by police officers regarding the complainants' reports as a "prior
consistent statement" exception to the hearsay rule; and (2) the reading of defendant's
presentence report by the probation officer before his conviction at the second trial.
60. Id at 827. The court cited People v. Gomez, 26 Cal. App. 3d 225, 230, 103 Cal.
Rptr. 80, 83-84 (1972); People v. Lombardi, 3 App. Div. 2d 700, 701, 332 N.Y.S.2d 749, 750-
51 (1972), aq'd, 33 N.Y.2d 658, 303 N.E.2d 705, 348 N.Y.S.2d 980 (1973), cert. denied, 416
U.S. 906 (1974). The court later pointed out that FED. R. EVID. 804(a)(4) and the corre-
sponding Uniform Rule of Evidence, also sanctioned unavailability if the declarant "is un-
able to be present or to testify at the hearing because of death, or then existing physical or
mental illness or infirmity." (emphasis added by court). Id at 828.
61. Id at 827. Although defendant argued that D.C. CODE ANN. § 14-303 (1981) ap-
plied and specifically prohibited a finding of unavailability on psychological grounds, the
court of appeals found this code section applicable only to former testimony ofparties and
not to the non-party witness testimony involvwd here.
62. See supra, note 61.
[Vol. 31:799
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fying might lead to permanent psychological injury or suicide, it was rea-
sonable for the court to declare her unavailable. The court, however, was
careful to limit its decision:
We do not intend to sanction a new category of medical un-
availability in all cases where witnesses are likely to suffer ad-
verse emotional or psychological effects as a result of testifying
against their assailants. But in the extreme circumstances here,
we agree that the grave risks to the witness' psychological health
justify excusing her live in-court testimony.63
The court was similarly unpersuaded that the trial court had abused its
discretion in declaring the other witness unavailable because she could not
be found. As the government was under a continuing good faith duty to
look for the witness and report any change to the court, it was reasonable
for the trial court to rely on the year old testimony absent any contrary
notification from the government.' 4 The trial court had no duty to request
a fresh recitation of the government's search efforts immediately before the
second trial.65
Although the court's ruling with regard to the unlocated witness appears
sound, its approval of "unavailability" for psychological reasons is more
troublesome. Specifically, the court failed to set forth a test by which the
amount of evidence needed to support such a claim, or the manner of ob-
taining such evidence, is to be determined. Later cases will undoubtedly
have to address these issues. The court's ruling leaves the government free
to claim psychological unavailability in a wide range of circumstances, for
trial judges to rule on the claim with little guidance from the court of ap-
peals, and for criminal defendants to bring each case to the higher court
for a more definitive, structured ruling.
III. MISSING WITNESS INSTRUCTION
A "missing witness" instruction may be issued to the jury when a party,
who has it peculiarly in his power to produce a witness whose testimony
would elucidate the alleged misconduct, fails to do so. 66 The fact that he
63. Warren, 436 A.2d at 829.
64. Id at 830.
65. Id at 831.
66. See, e.g., E. DEVITT & C. BLACKMAR, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUC-
TIONS-CIVIL AND CRIMINAL § 11.33, at 250 (1970). The model instruction suggested by
Devitt and Blackmar is almost identical to the one used by the trial court in Harris v. United
States, 430 A.2d 536 (D.C. 1981). Here, the court issued the following instruction to the jury:
If you find that a witness who could have given material testimony on an issue in
this case was peculiarly within the power of one party to produce [but] was not
produced by that party and his absence has not been sufficiently accounted for or
1982]
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does not call the witness is allowed, through the "missing witness" instruc-
tion, to create an inference in the jury's mind that the testimony, if pro-
duced, would have been unfavorable.
Because the instruction allows a damaging presumption to be created,
courts carefully restrict the instruction to situations where (1) it is "pecu-
liarly within the party's power to produce the witness," and (2) the wit-
ness's testimony would "elucidate the transaction., 6 7 In assessing whether
a witness is "peculiarly available" to the defendant, District of Columbia
courts have traditionally found it significant that a close relationship exists
between the two.68 Thus, when a witness who has some close bond with
the defendant fails to give what could be valuable, mitigating testimony,
there is a strong implication that his testimony would, in fact, be
damaging.69
In Harris v. United States,7 ° the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
expanded the meaning of "peculiarly available" to include a witness with
whom the defendant had no significant relationship. Defendants Cosby
and Harris were convicted of possession of narcotics in violation of D.C.
Code section 33-402. Detective Thomas, a plainclothes officer, was driving
in the District when he was approached by defendant Cosby. They negoti-
ated the sale of a single Dilaudid pill for $32. According to Officer
Thomas, Cosby then walked up to defendant Harris, entered a garage with
him and reemerged with the pill a few minutes later. Officer Thomas paid
Cosby for the drug with marked bills. As he drove away, he saw Cosby
give the money to Harris.7 After Officer Thomas relayed a description of
explained, then you may, if you deem it appropriate, infer that the testimony of the
witness would have been unfavorable to the party which failed to produce him.
However, no such inference should be drawn by you with regard to a witness
who was equally within the power of either party to produce or whose testimony
would have been merely cumulative or immaterial.
430 A.2d at 540 n.5.
67. Id. at 542. The court cited Dent v. United States, 404 A.2d 165, 169-70 (D.C. 1979);
Conyers v. United States, 309 A.2d 309, 312-13 (D.C. 1973); Wynn v. United States, 397
F.2d 621, 625 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
68. United States v. Young, 463 F.2d 934, 942 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Hale v. United States;
361 A.2d 212, 216 (D.C. 1976).
69. In Hale v. United States, 361 A.2d 216 (D.C. 1976), the defendant was convicted of
assault with a dangerous weapon and carrying a pistol without a license. The court had
issued a "missing witness" instruction after Hale's girlfriend refused to testify on his behalf.
Significantly, his girlfriend had previously testified before a grand jury that Hale had shot
the complainant in self defense. In view of the witness's former testimony and of her rela-
tionship with the defendant, the court affi.'med the "missing witness" instruction as
appropriate.
70. 430 A.2d 536 (D.C. 1981).
71. Expert testimony was presented at trial that identified the defendants' conduct as
"juggling." This method of conducting drug transactions is used to separate possession of
[Vol. 31:799
Evidence
the two to other officers, both defendants were quickly arrested.
At their trial, both defendants presented alibis. Defendant Cosby
claimed that he was in the vicinity to see a "reverend" about painting a
church, and that the clergyman had been standing with him when he was
arrested.7 2 Defendant Harris testified that he was in the area waiting for
his brother, "Cornbread" Harris and, a few minutes before his arrest, had
been given $50 by an unknown man and instructed to deliver the money to
"Cornbread. 73 This, Harris explained, was why he had the marked bills
in his possession when he was arrested. 4 Neither Cosby nor Harris pro-
duced their alibi witnesses to corroborate their explanations. Over their
objection, the trial judge issued a "missing witness" instruction to the jury
with regard to both witnesses. When the jury returned guilty verdicts, the
defendants appealed alleging, inter alia,75 that the "missing witness" in-
struction had been improper.
In a split decision, the court of appeals affirmed. Judge Harris, writing
for the majority, was persuaded that the instruction was proper because
the "inference of unfavorable testimony from [the] absent witness[es] was a
natural and reasonable one."7 6 Cosby argued that the instruction should
not have been given because the clergyman was not "peculiarly available"
to him. He described his various attempts to locate the clergyman and his
ultimate inability to produce him for the trial.77 Although noting that the
"missing witness" instruction should not be given where the defendant has
made a bona fide effort to find the witness,7" the court refused to overrule
the lower court's finding that the defendant's attempts had not met that
standard.7 9 Thus, it concluded that defendant Cosby failed to show that
the drug from intent to sell it, as well as reduce the possibility of the solicitor being robbed
when he approaches a potential buyer. 430 A.2d at 539 and n.3.
72. Id. at 539.
73. Id
74. Id
75. The defendants also challenged their convictions on the basis of prosecutorial mis-
conduct. Although agreeing that the prosecutor had engaged in misconduct, the court was
unpersuaded that his conduct amounted to prejudicial error. 430 A.2d at 540-41.
76. The court was quoting from Burgess v. United States, 440 F.2d 226, 234 (D.C. Cir.
1970). It also cited 2 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 286 (Chadbourn rev. 1979) in support of this
standard.
77. Harri, 430 A.2d at 542.
78. See United States v. Dixon, 469 F.2d 940, 942 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Shelton v.
United States, 388 A.2d 859, 865 (D.C. 1978); Nowlin v. United States, 382 A.2d 9, 13 (D.C.
1978).
79. The court emphasized that the two-prong "missing witness" test of "peculiar availa-
bility" and "elucidating" testimony is a factual determination to be made by the trial judge.
Harris, 430 A.2d at 542 (citing authority). It was therefore reluctant to question the lower
court's factual determination about the witness' availability. Id at 543.
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the clergyman was not "peculiarly available" to him.
Defendant Harris challenged the instruction on the ground that "Corn-
bread's" testimony could not have "elucidated the transaction." Again, the
court disagreed. Although "Cornbread" could not shed light on Harris'
alleged drug possession,"° he could corroborate the defendant's allegedly
innocent presence in the area. And, as no other witness testified as to this
alibi defense, "Cornbread's" testimony was important and non-
cumulative.81
Chief Judge Newman concurred and dissented in part. He strongly dis-
agreed that the "missing witness" instruction was proper. In his view, the
clergyman was not "peculiarly available" to Cosby. As Cosby hardly knew
the clergyman, there was no close relationship that would make him more
"peculiarly available" to the defendant than to the state.8" And, by focus-
ing solely on the clergyman's physical proximity in the forum, the court
undermined the meaning of the term "peculiarly available." There could
be no "natural and reasonable" inference of unfavorable testimony where
the defendant was simply unable to procure a disinterested witness who
was almost a stranger to him.83 One of the underlying premises of the in-
struction was that the witness's relationship with the defendant was such
that he or she would give mitigating testimony on behalf of the defendant
if at all possible. In view of that relationship, it was particularly damaging
when the witness failed to come forward. Therefore, in Judge Newman's
view, that a particular witness was physically nearby did not satisfy the
"peculiarly available" prong of the "missing witness" test.8 ° Noting also
that the record evidenced a bona fide attempt to procure the clergyman,
85
80. Judge Newman, in his partial dissent, called for a more narrow reading of the "elu-
cidating" testimony requirement. In his view, the testimony should only be considered eluci-
dating if it sheds light on the misconduct with which the defendant is charged. Thus, it
should not be admitted only where it is of help with regard to the "transaction," or offense,
at issue. 430 A.2d at 546.
81. Id at 543.
82. Id at 545.
83. Id
84. Judge Newman felt also that the clergyman's testimony could not have "elucidated
the transaction" at issue. The clergyman's testimony could shed no light on whether defend-
ant Cosby had drugs in his possession; at best, it would have offered some explanation as to
why Cosby was in the neighborhood. Such testimony, if not entirely irrelevant, was insuffi-
cient to satisfy the second prong of the "missing witness" test. Accord Dyson v. United
States, 418 A.2d 127 (D.C. 1980)(prosecutor's comments about missing witness improper
where witnesses could only corroborate defendant's alibi that he had been with them and
could shed no light on whether defendant had actually committed breaking and entering
with which he was charged).
85. Harris, 430 A.2d at 545-46.
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Judge Newman concluded that Cosby's conviction should be reversed and
the defendant be given a new trial.
As to defendant Harris, Judge Newman disagreed that "Cornbread"
could have "elucidated the transaction." 6 Because Harris was convicted of
drug possession based on his possession of the marked bills, "Cornbread's"
testimony would only be elucidating if it shed light on the drug transac-
tion.87 That "Cornbread" could corroborate Harris' explanation of his
presence in the neighborhood was irrelevant to the central issue in the
trial. Moreover, the relevant standard for judging the propriety of issuing a
"missing witness" instruction in the absence of testimony was, in Judge
Newman's view, whether "Cornbread's" testimony would have been likely
to elucidate the transaction.88 He felt it to be highly, and impermissibly,
speculative to deduce that "Cornbread" would have had some knowledge
of the drug transaction through his alleged connection with the bills.8 9 In
view of all the evidence against Harris, however, Judge Newman was
finally satisfied that the "missing witness" instruction was harmless error,
and approved the majority's affirmation of Harris' conviction.90
The court's opinion in Harris seems to expand the possible situations in
which a "missing witness" instruction may be given by redefining the term
"peculiarly available." The inherent danger in the instruction, as the dis-
sent points out, is that it creates evidence from non-evidence by allowing a
damaging inference to be drawn from silence.9 This danger may be some-
what curtailed by ensuring that the witness has some relationship with the
defendant. Focusing only on whether the witness is physically available,
however, threatens seriously to erode the protections that have been built
into the doctrine. Moreover, there is significant authority that the instruc-
tion should not be given where the witness is equally available to both
parties to the action. It is disallowed because the failure to produce a wit-
ness should remain open to an inference against both parties.92 However, if
District of Columbia courts are instructed only to examine the physical
86. Id at 547.
87. Id. See supra note 80.
88. Id
89. Even if "Cornbread's" testimony could have explained the passage of the marked
bills, he would only have illuminated an issue that was "collateral" to the central "transac-
tion" (possession of drugs). As Judge Newman pointed out, the court of appeals had previ-
ously indicated in Coombs v. United States, 399 A.2d 1313 (D.C. 1979), that such testimony
was insufficient to allow a missing witness instruction: "We have extreme difficulty in con-
cluding that the missing witness doctrine could be invoked under circumstances where the
transaction to be elucidated is a totally collateral one . Id at 1317.
90. Harris, 430 A.2d at 548.
91. Id at 544-45.
92. See United States v. Evanchik, 413 F.2d 950, 954 (2d Cir. 1969); Beale v. United
1982]
Catholic University Law Review
availability of a witness, they may begin using the instruction where the
witness is equally available to both the state and the accused rather than
"peculiarly available" to the defendant. Indeed, by disregarding any ex-
amination of the relationship, the court's holding in Harris raises an in-
creased possibility of future abuse by leaving the term "peculiarly
available" open to any interpretation that an advocate is able to press on
the trial judge.
D. Patrick Gallaher, Daniel Ham, Nancy Ledogar
States, 263 F.2d 859 (2d. Cir. 1959); Johnson v. United States, 291 F.2d 150, 155 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 880 (1961).
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